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1INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are leading experts who have worked for 
decades at the intersection of criminal and immigration 
law to ensure that criminal defense counsel have the 
resources necessary to represent non-citizens effectively. 
Amici founded the nationwide Defending Immigrants 
Partnership (DIP) in 2002 to coordinate with national 
criminal defense organizations to help ensure that indigent 
non-citizen defendants are provided effective criminal 
defense counsel to avoid or minimize the immigration 
consequences of their criminal dispositions. The partners 
and members of DIP have participated as amicus curiae 
in Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015), Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
289 (2001), and many other cases at the intersection of 
criminal and immigration law.
Starting well before this Court decided Padilla, 
and before the petitioner in this case was misadvised 
regarding the immigration consequences of his plea of 
guilty, amici provided immigration advice and training 
and published materials on the immigration consequences 
of criminal convictions that described a wide variety of 
methods that defense counsel can use to avoid deportation 
and other severe immigration consequences that can 
follow even relatively minor convictions. Amici have a 
strong interest in ensuring that non-citizen defendants 
1.  Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici affirm that no counsel for a 
party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person 
other than amici and its counsel made a monetary contribution to 
its preparation or submission. Counsel for all parties have consented 
to the filing of this brief, in letters that are on file with the Clerk or 
submitted contemporaneously with this brief.
2are not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to advise, negotiate, 
and advocate toward the goal of avoiding unintended 
and unnecessarily severe immigration consequences, 
as required under defense counsel’s clear constitutional 
duties to advise about immigration consequences and to 
plea bargain effectively that this Court set out in Padilla, 
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, 
566 U.S. 156 (2012). Amici thus seek to ensure that non-
citizens who are prejudiced when counsel’s incompetence 
forecloses reasonable alternative dispositions to avoid 
mandatory deportation have an avenue for relief through 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
The Immigrant Defense Project (IDP) is a nonprofit 
legal resource and training center that defends the legal, 
constitutional, and human rights of immigrants facing 
criminal or deportation charges. IDP supports criminal 
defense attorneys through individual case consultations, 
trainings and mentorship, development and dissemination 
of defense strategies to avoid deportation triggers, and 
publication of written resources. IDP’s 20-year-old hotline 
provides criminal defense attorneys with free guidance 
to help determine the immigration impact of non-citizens’ 
criminal convictions, charges, and plea offers, suggest 
alternate dispositions that may protect immigration 
status, and discuss post-conviction relief options. In 
addition, since 1998, IDP has published resource materials 
for criminal defense lawyers, including Representing 
Immigrant Defendants in New York, which in 2005 
was adapted by DIP for defense lawyers nationwide. 
See Defending Immigrants Partnership, Representing 
Immigrant Defendants: A National Guide (2005-2008).
3The Immigrant Legal Resource Center (ILRC) is 
a national organization that provides legal trainings, 
educational materials, and advocacy to advance immigrant 
rights. For thirty years ILRC has had an “Attorney of 
the Day” service that offers consultations on immigration 
law and the immigration consequences of convictions to 
attorneys, employees of non-profit organizations, public 
defenders, and others assisting immigrants. Public 
defender offices throughout California contract with 
ILRC to strategize about alternative immigration-safe 
dispositions in individual cases for non-citizen clients. 
ILRC has a number of publications specifically for defense 
attorneys. See, e.g., Katherine Brady et al., Defending 
Immigrants in the Ninth Circuit: Impact of Crimes under 
California and Other State Laws (10th ed. 2008, updated 
2013); California Criminal Defense – Procedure and 
Practice (CEB 2016) (including chapter on defending non-
citizens). ILRC also has a free online “quick reference” 
chart that analyzes the immigration consequences 
of more than 200 convictions in California, and helped 
create similar charts and materials analyzing offenses 
in Arizona, Nevada, and Washington. See, e.g., ILRC, 
Quick Reference Chart, www.ilrc.org/chart (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2017).
The National Immigration Project of the National 
Lawyers Guild (NIPNLG) is a national nonprofit 
organization that provides legal and technical support to 
attorneys, legal workers, immigrant communities, and 
advocates seeking to advance the rights of non-citizens. 
For 30 years, the NIPNLG has provided legal training to 
the bar and the bench on the immigration consequences 
of criminal conduct and authored Immigration Law 
and Crimes and four other treatises published by 
4Thomson-Reuters. Since 2003, NIPNLG has produced a 
comprehensive chart, Selected Immigration Consequences 
of Certain Federal Offenses.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY  
OF ARGUMENT
If the government’s allegation of strong evidence 
of guilt precluded a demonstration of prejudice under 
Strickland ’s second prong, then Jose Padilla—the 
petitioner in Padilla who was  a 40-year lawful permanent 
resident, served in Vietnam, and had little connection 
with his country of origin—would have long ago been 
deported from the United States. Law enforcement found 
a large quantity of marijuana in his licensed commercial 
truck after he consented to the search. See Brief for 
Respondent at 2, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 
(2010) (No. 08-651). When asked what the packages in 
the back of his truck contained, Mr. Padilla reportedly 
said, “maybe drugs.” Id. at 3. Mr. Padilla litigated and 
lost a suppression hearing before pleading guilty in 2002 
to state felony marijuana trafficking on his attorney’s 
erroneous advice that he had been in the United States 
too long to be deported. Id.; see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 
359. In fact, marijuana trafficking is one of many crimes 
considered an “aggravated felony” under immigration 
law and as such it condemned Mr. Padilla to the harshest 
possible immigration consequences: mandatory detention 
and mandatory deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) 
(defining “aggravated felony” to include illicit trafficking 
in a controlled substance).
With the benefit of correct legal advice and proper 
negotiations, Mr. Padilla’s case turned out differently. 
5After this Court ruled in Mr. Padilla’s favor on the attorney 
competence prong of his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, see Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360, the Kentucky Court 
of Appeals on remand found prejudice in part because, 
“had the immigration consequences of Padilla’s plea been 
factored into the plea bargaining process, trial counsel 
may have obtained a plea agreement that would not have 
the consequence of mandatory deportation.” Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 381 S.W.3d 322, 330 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012). After 
his conviction was vacated, Mr. Padilla’s counsel secured 
a “deferred prosecution” deal which avoided a guilty 
plea. The charges against Mr. Padilla were ultimately 
dismissed with prejudice after he completed supervision 
without further police contact. As a result, he has no 
conviction or other record resulting from this situation. 
Letter from Timothy G. Arnold, Director, Post-Trials 
Division, Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy (Feb. 
6, 2017).2
When a non-citizen charged with a crime prioritizes 
the ability to remain in the United States, then counsel’s 
primary aim must be to avoid a conviction that leads to 
deportation. Sometimes this means the non-citizen will 
make the rational decision to take his or her chances and 
go to trial. But since “plea bargaining is . . . not some 
adjunct to the criminal justice system . . . [but rather] is 
the criminal system,” Frye, 566 U.S. at 144 (quoting Scott 
& Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 
1909, 1912 (1992)), more often it means that counsel must 
2.  These accounts are drawn from court decisions as well as 
correspondence between Amici and counsel or former counsel for 
the immigrants involved. All documentation is on file with counsel 
for Amici and is available at the Court’s request.
6negotiate creatively to secure a plea that avoids or at least 
mitigates adverse immigration consequences.
Defense counsel’s ability to secure a plea or alternative 
disposition that preserves the non-citizen’s ability to avoid 
deportation depends on a number of factors. First, counsel 
must fulfill the constitutionally mandated obligation to 
assess the immigration consequences of a conviction and 
advise non-citizen clients accordingly to determine the 
client’s goals. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369. Second, if the 
client’s goals include avoiding deportation, counsel must 
identify alternative dispositions that satisfy their client’s 
instruction. See Part II, infra (describing numerous 
resources available to guide defenders on bargaining to 
avoid unnecessarily harsh immigration consequences). 
Third, counsel must marshal their client’s personal 
circumstances, including the consequences of deportation, 
to advocate for a favorable disposition. A non-citizen’s 
strong ties and long residency in the United States or 
danger of physical harm or death if returned to his or 
her country of origin are precisely the sort of family, 
community, and justice-oriented factors that prosecutors 
regularly consider. See, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice, Prosecution Function and Defense Function, 
Standard 3-4.4(a) (4th ed. Apr. 2015) (“Among the factors 
which the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising 
discretion to initiate, decline, or dismiss a criminal charge 
. . . are . . . whether the authorized or likely punishment or 
collateral consequences are disproportionate in relation 
to the particular offense or the offender.”); see also id. 
at Standard 3-5.6(c) (“The prosecutor should consider 
collateral consequences of a conviction before entering 
into a disposition agreement.”). Cf. Nat’l Dist. Attorneys 
Assoc., National Prosecution Standards § 4-1.3.k (3d. ed. 
72009) (“Undue hardship . . . to the accused” can be a basis 
for declination of prosecution).
These specific yet objective factors, and not the 
personal predilections of a particular prosecutor, drive 
the prejudice prong of any ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. If it is reasonably probable that—with effective 
assistance of counsel—the defendant would have rejected 
a plea offer that carried severe immigration consequences 
and taken his or her chances at a trial, that defendant was 
prejudiced by counsel’s failure to inform the defendant 
of the plea’s immigration consequences. The defendant is 
also prejudiced when it is reasonably probable under the 
objective circumstances of the case that he or she would 
have rejected the offer to allow competent defense counsel 
to attempt to secure a plea or other disposition that avoids 
deportation.
This brief illustrates the many ways that defense 
counsel and prosecutors can, and do, negotiate in all types 
of cases to meet the goals of both parties, see St. Cyr, 
533 U.S. at 323 (noting the “great number of defendants 
[who] agreed to plead guilty” to keep avenues of relief 
from deportation open and the “prosecutors [who] have 
received the benefit of these plea agreements”), and how 
counsel’s failure to pursue these reasonably probable 
avenues prejudices the client. See Zemene v. Clark, 768 
S.E.2d 684, 690 (Va. 2015) (citing Frye, 566 U.S. at 146) 
(“[A] proven desire to go to trial is not the only context in 
which prejudice may occur where a defendant has accepted 
a plea agreement upon improper and inadequate advice 
of counsel.”).
8ARGUMENT
Padilla tells us that it violates the competency prong of 
Strickland’s ineffective assistance test when counsel fails 
to advise a client correctly about deportation consequences 
of a conviction. Frye and Lafler instruct that effective plea 
bargaining is a core part of counsel’s Sixth Amendment 
duties. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 162 (“Defendants have a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, a right that extends to the 
plea-bargaining process.”). Mr. Lee’s case demonstrates 
how counsel’s failure properly to recognize and advise a 
client of a plea’s adverse immigration consequences can 
prejudice non-citizens by depriving them of the crucial 
opportunity to bargain for an alternative disposition that 
avoids harsh immigration consequences.
I. A Primary Way Non-Citizens Facing Allegedly 
Strong Evidence Against Them Can Suffer 
Prejudice is From Defense Counsel’s Failure to 
Negotiate an Alternative Disposition That Avoids 
The Most Serious Immigration Consequences.
This Court has recognized that counsel with only 
a “rudimentary understanding of the deportation 
consequences of a particular criminal offense may be able 
to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to 
craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of 
deportation, as by avoiding a conviction for an offense that 
automatically triggers the removal consequence.” Padilla, 
559 U.S. at 373; see also Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 
275 n.10 (2012) (“Armed with knowledge that a guilty 
plea would preclude travel abroad, aliens like Vartelas 
might endeavor to negotiate a plea to a nonexcludable 
offense—in Vartelas’ case, e.g., possession of counterfeit 
9securities”); Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1987 (non-citizen 
defendants “anticipate the immigration consequences of 
guilty pleas in criminal court,” and enter “safe harbor 
guilty pleas that do not expose the alien defendant to 
the risk of immigration sanctions”) (internal quotation 
omitted). Indeed, the prejudice a non-citizen can suffer 
from counsel’s failure to negotiate to avoid deportation is 
so clear that one state with a large immigrant population 
requires prosecutors to “consider the avoidance of adverse 
immigration consequences in the plea negotiation process 
as one factor in an effort to reach a just resolution.” See 
Cal. Penal Code § 1016.3(b); see also id. § 1016.2(d) (“With 
an accurate understanding of immigration consequences, 
many non-citizen defendants are able to plead to a 
conviction and sentence that satisfy the prosecution and 
court, but that have no, or fewer, adverse immigration 
consequences than the original charge.”).
The recognition that immigration consequences can 
play a vital role in plea negotiations contrasts sharply with 
Mr. Lee’s experience with a trial lawyer who confirmed 
that “[t]here was never any discussion of deportation 
during the negotiation . . . of the plea agreement or 
during the sentencing. It was my understanding that the 
government was not seeking deportation of Mr. Jae Lee.” 
Evid. Hr’g, at 34-35. Mr. Lee, like other similarly situated 
non-citizens whose counsel fails to take advantage of the 
myriad resources and avenues to mitigate immigration 
consequences, suffered prejudice when he was deprived 
of the opportunity to have counsel seek alternative 
dispositions that avoided mandatory deportation, despite 
the reasonable probability that he would have declined to 
plead guilty to pursue such alternatives, or go to trial.
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Across a broad spectrum of offenses, it is possible 
to negotiate dispositions that either avoid deportation 
altogether, or avoid mandatory deportation. As the 
following case examples illustrate, competent counsel 
in state and federal criminal cases can and do avoid or 
mitigate adverse immigration consequences even where 
alternative dispositions seem difficult at first glance.
A. In a Wide Variety of Offenses, Counsel Can—
And Do—Secure Pleas That Both Satisfy the 
Prosecutor’s Goals and Avoid Deportation.
In many cases, counsel attuned to immigration 
consequences can secure an alternative outcome that 
avoids the most severe among them. They routinely do so 
even where there is strong evidence of guilt, particularly 
when their non-citizen client has strong ties to the 
United States. In some instances, that means avoiding an 
aggravated felony conviction, which results in mandatory 
detention and deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at 
any time after admission is deportable.”); id. § 1229b(a)
(3) (barring cancellation of removal for lawful permanent 
residents convicted of an aggravated felony); id. § 1226(c)
(1)(B) (mandating detention for individuals charged with 
deportability on aggravated felony conviction grounds). 
This outcome may allow the non-citizen to seek avenues 
of relief from deportation, such as cancellation of removal, 
not available to those convicted of aggravated felonies. 
See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323 (describing cancellation of 
removal’s statutory predecessor as “one of the principal 
benefits sought by defendants deciding whether to accept 
a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial”). In other 
instances, defense counsel will be able to negotiate a 
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plea that avoids most if not all immigration consequences 
altogether, sometimes to a charge that is the functional 
equivalent of the original charge or that carries an even 
higher penalty. In yet other instances, rational insistence 
on the constitutional right to a trial results in a better plea 
offer, deferred prosecution or diversion, or even dismissal 
of the charges as the trial date approaches.
One common example is avoiding a theft aggravated 
felony, one of several crimes for which “aggravated felony” 
status turns on the length of the sentence imposed. See 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (defining “aggravated felony” 
to include “a theft offense . . . for which the term of 
imprisonment [is] at least one year.”). This is the case 
even if the sentence is suspended. Id. § 1101(a)(48)(B) 
(“any reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence 
with respect to an offense is deemed to include the period 
of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law 
regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution 
of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part”). In 
many state misdemeanor shoplifting cases, the maximum 
sentence under state law is one year. See, e.g., N.Y. 
Penal Law § 155.25. Bargaining with the prosecution or 
advocating with the court for a sentence of 364 days—just 
one day less than the maximum—will avoid an aggravated 
felony conviction. The following examples illustrate how 
the prosecution’s goals can often be met, and the court 
satisfied, by a guilty plea and a sentence of 364 suspended 
days or even some amount of imposed jail time.
•  Michael Zemene, who lawfully entered the United 
States at age nine from Ethiopia as the child 
of an asylee, was charged with petit larceny in 
Virginia for stealing $33 worth of beer. Zemene, 
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768 S.E.2d at 686. His 2013 guilty plea with a 
365-day suspended sentence got him out of jail 
earlier than the one-year maximum sentence, 
but his attorney failed to advise him that it also 
made him deportable. Id. at 687. In remanding 
the case for an evidentiary hearing on prejudice, 
the Virginia Supreme Court properly noted that 
“in advancing a claim of prejudice due to defense 
counsel’s failure to advise him of the immigration 
consequences when entering a plea agreement, 
Zemene need not demonstrate a likelihood of 
acquittal at trial. Rather, the question is ‘whether 
counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance 
affected the outcome of the plea process.’” Id. at 
691 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 
(1985)) (emphasis added); see also Zemene, 768 
S.E.2d at 692 (“[T]he court’s consideration of the 
rationality of a decision whether to accept or reject 
a plea agreement must include a properly advised 
defendant’s desire to avoid a negative impact on 
his immigration status.”). Before the evidentiary 
hearing, Mr. Zemene’s counsel secured a new plea 
agreement whereby Mr. Zemene re-pleaded to the 
petit larceny charge in exchange for a negotiated 
360-day suspended jail sentence. Letter from Scott 
C. Seguin, Attorney for Mr. Zemene (Feb. 3, 2017).
•  After Waid Mohamed was convicted of grand 
larceny for shoplifting nearly $2,000 worth of 
merchandise, a Virginia court sentenced him to 
two years of incarceration, all suspended, and two 
years of probation. Commonwealth v. Mohamed, 
71 Va. Cir. 383, 383-84 (2006). In granting his writ 
of coram nobis and resentencing Mr. Mohamed to 
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360 days of suspended jail time, the court found 
prejudice in the fact that, had the court “been 
made aware of the fact that Mohamed’s single 
criminal conviction could result in deportation 
without the possibility of discretionary relief, an 
alternative sentence may have been reached.” Id. 
at 385. Similarly, another Virginia trial court judge 
stated that, had the court known at the time of 
sentencing that a 12-month suspended sentence 
would result in an aggravated felony conviction 
for a 42-year old lawful permanent resident who 
was “gainfully employed, and married to a U.S. 
citizen with two U.S. citizen children,” the court 
“undoubtedly” would have imposed an alternative 
sentence. Commonwealth v. Sharma, 58 Va. Cir. 
460, 462 (2002).
In other cases, deferred prosecution or diversion can 
fulfill the prosecution’s goal of rehabilitation and perhaps 
restitution, yet also allow a non-citizen to avoid deportation.
•  In Nashville, Tennessee state court, C.M. was 
charged with felony theft of property of $10,000 
or more but less than $60,000. The state alleged 
that C.M. stole money from a man for whom she 
was a caretaker. C.M.’s public defender was aware 
of C.M.’s pending application for non-lawful-
permanent-resident cancellation of removal. See 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b); Letter from Mary-Kathryn 
Harcombe, Assistant Public Defender, Nashville 
Metro Public Defender’s Office (Feb. 6, 2017). 
Despite the serious nature of the allegations, 
counsel negotiated an agreement where C.M. 
stipulated that her name would be placed on 
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the Tennessee Department of Health’s “Abuse 
Registry.” In exchange, the charges against her 
were dismissed with prejudice. Id. This outcome 
allowed C.M. to retain eligibility for deportation 
relief.
•  In the Eastern District of Tennessee in 2013, 
B.N. faced charges of theft of government funds 
under 18 U.S.C. § 641 and making false statements 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for omitting information 
regarding her income and employment on her 
Section 8 housing renewal form. The government 
alleged that B.N. received approximately $23,000 
more in rent subsidies than she was entitled to 
based on her actual income. B.N. had fled to 
the United States from Liberia about six years 
before she was investigated for the federal 
crimes. Because the fraud charges involved an 
amount more than $10,000, a conviction would be 
categorized by federal immigration authorities 
as an aggravated felony, even if the charge were 
reduced to a misdemeanor. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)
(43)(M)(i) (defining aggravated felony to include 
an offense that “involves fraud or deceit in which 
the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.”). 
B.N.’s federal defender successfully advocated for 
B.N.’s admission into the federal Pretrial Diversion 
program based on the immigration consequences 
of a conviction. Under the agreement, prosecution 
was deferred for 18 months on various conditions, 
including supervision by the United States 
Probation Office and monthly payments towards 
full restitution. B.N successfully completed 
diversion and no immigration case against her 
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was ever opened. She continues to work and both 
of her daughters have completed graduate-level 
studies and are employed. Letter from Paula 
Voss, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Eastern 
District of Tennessee (Feb. 3, 2017).
B. In Drug Offense Cases, There are Numerous 
Avenues to Avoid Mandatory Deportation or 
to Avoid Deportation Altogether Yet Still Meet 
Prosecutorial Goals.
Drug crime convictions can be particularly problematic 
for non-citizens when incompetent counsel advises a guilty 
plea without regard for immigration consequences or after 
erroneously assuring the client that such consequences 
will not follow. On the other hand, effective defense counsel 
can rescue their client from deportation by pursuing one or 
more of the multiple alternative options available in drug 
cases to avoid unintended and overly harsh immigration 
consequences.
Offenses that qualify as “drug trafficking crime[s]” 
are aggravated felonies under immigration law. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(B). A drug conviction that necessarily 
involves a controlled substance as defined in 21 U.S.C. 
§ 802—except a single possession offense for personal 
use of 30 grams or less of marijuana—also makes 
a non-citizen deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
However, while “controlled substance” convictions that 
are not aggravated felonies still trigger deportability, 
they do not  necessarily  disqualify a lawful permanent 
resident from seeking discretionary cancellation of 
removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). In certain instances, 
non-citizens facing a drug trafficking aggravated felony 
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charge will “trade any concern in order to avoid removal 
so that they can remain in the United States with their 
families.” American Bar Association, Report to the House 
of Delegates 6 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/sections/
criminaljustice/PublicDocuments/100C_1.authcheckdam.
pdf (last accessed Feb. 8, 2017). Still, not all state felony 
drug convictions are aggravated felonies. See, e.g., Lopez 
v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47, 53-60 (2006) (holding that South 
Dakota felony drug possession conviction was not a felony 
under the federal Controlled Substances Act and thus 
was not an aggravated felony). Moreover, a guilty plea to 
a state drug offense which includes substances not on the 
federal schedule may not qualify as a deportable offense 
if the record of conviction does not name a federally 
controlled substance. See Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1984 
(finding that a “conviction for concealing unnamed pills 
in [a] sock did not trigger removal”).
 Congress also provided a powerful ameliorative 
mechanism that enables an eligible drug offender who 
successfully completes probation to avoid “a disability 
imposed by law upon conviction of a crime, or for any other 
purpose.” 18 U.S.C. § 3607(b). See Dan Kesselbrenner 
& Lory D. Rosenberg, Immigration Law and Crimes 
§ 4.2 (2016) (opining that this expansive language would 
insulate a non-citizen from having a conviction for 
immigration purposes). Finally, pre-plea diversion such as 
in Mr. Padilla’s case supra, or dismissal such as in M.I.’s 
case infra, does not qualify as a conviction and thus does 
not lead to deportation.
This wide variety of deportation-avoiding dispositions 
means that effective counsel representing non-citizens 
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facing drug charges can often reach outcomes that allow 
their clients to preserve their lawful status in the United 
States. The following cases illustrate how counsel can, 
and do, achieve this goal.
State Drug Cases
•  M.I., who was from the Darfur region of Sudan 
and had been granted asylum, was inside his 
apartment when agents executed a search warrant 
and recovered a box containing approximately 
five pounds of marijuana in his bedroom. After 
Miranda warnings, M.I. admitted that he knew 
what was inside the box. M.I. was charged in 
Nashville, Tennessee state court and detained 
on bail on felony marijuana trafficking charges. 
The prosecution offered him a plea bargain to 
misdemeanor facilitation of sale of marijuana 
with a straight probationary sentence, which 
would have resulted in his immediate release 
from jail. M.I. rejected that offer after effective 
counsel advised him it would result in mandatory 
deportation. He chose to remain in jail for eight 
months before counsel secured his release on bond. 
Ultimately, the prosecution agreed to dismiss the 
charges against M.I. Letter from Mary-Kathryn 
Harcombe, Assistant Public Defender, Nashville 
Metro Public Defender’s Office (Feb. 6, 2017). As 
with Mr. Padilla’s eventual dismissal, described 
supra, M.I.’s outcome avoided all immigration 
consequences.
•  Dave Bautista, a 28-year old lawful permanent 
resident who had lived in the United States for 
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17 years and had a mother, five siblings, wife, and 
two children who were all American citizens, was 
charged with and pleaded guilty to possession 
for sale of marijuana in California state court. 
People v. Bautista, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 862, 870 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004). He was sentenced to 16 
months in prison. Id. at 866. This conviction was 
an aggravated felony, so it made Mr. Bautista 
mandatorily deportable. Remanding the case to 
the trial court for an evidentiary hearing, the 
appeals court noted how Mr. Bautista’s defense 
attorney could have bargained to have Mr. 
Bautista plead to “a different but related offense” 
or “to ‘plead up’ to a non-aggravated felony even if 
the penalty was stiffer.” Id. at 870. Either of those 
alternatives would have allowed Mr. Bautista to 
seek cancellation of removal. Id.
Federal Drug Cases
•  Beatriz Ramirez-Carrillo, a lawful permanent 
resident for 23 years, had raised her children in 
Southern California and had no prior criminal 
history. See Transcript of Bond Hearing at 5, 
United States v. Ramirez-Carillo, No. 3:15-cr-
01464-H (S.D. Cal. May 29, 2015), ECF No. 25. 
After Ms. Ramirez-Carrillo consented to a canine 
sniff of her car and the canine gave a positive 
alert for narcotics, federal agents discovered 3.2 
kilograms of crystal methamphetamine hidden in 
the car’s trunk. Complaint at ¶¶2-3, United States 
v. Ramirez-Carillo, No. 3:15-cr-01464-H (S.D. 
Cal. May 26, 2015), ECF No. 1. Like Mr. Lee, Ms. 
Ramirez-Carrillo was charged under 21 U.S.C. 
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§ 841(a)(1), Possession with the Intent to Distribute 
a Controlled Substance. Id. at 3. After litigating 
several motions and magistrate appeals, defense 
counsel secured a plea that will avoid deportability. 
The government filed a superseding Information 
charging Ms. Ramirez-Carrillo with making a 
false statement to a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001. See Superseding Information, United 
States v. Ramirez-Carrillo, No. 3:15-cr-01464-H 
(S.D. Cal. Jul. 14, 2015), ECF No. 38. She pleaded 
guilty to that charge and was sentenced to three 
years of probation and a $250 fine. See Judgment, 
United States v. Ramirez-Carrillo, No. 3:15-cr-
01464-H (S.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2015), ECF No. 59.
•  Rafael Omar Rueda-Carrazco was stopped at the 
border after a canine on roving inspection alerted 
to his car. Border Patrol Officers found 89 pounds 
of marijuana in the four car tires. He was charged 
under 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 & 960, federal drug offenses 
that carry the same sentencing guidelines and 
mandatory minimums as 21 U.S.C. § 841. See 
Complaint, United States v. Rueda-Carrazco, No. 
3:12-cr-00469-IEG (S.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2012), ECF 
No. 1. Mr. Rueda-Carrazco’s federal public defender 
negotiated a guilty plea to 18 U.S.C. § 4, Misprision 
of Felony, with four months in jail followed by 
two years of supervised release. See Judgment, 
United States v. Rueda-Carrazco, No. 3:12-cr-
00469-IEG (S.D. Cal. May 15, 2012), ECF No. 26. 
Unlike the original charges, the negotiated plea 
was not an aggravated felony under immigration 
law. See, e.g., Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I. 
& N. Dec. 955, 958 (BIA 1997) (discussing that 
20
nature of a misprision conviction does not incur 
deportability for the underlying crime concealed); 
Matter of Velasco, 16 I. & N. Dec. 281, 283 (BIA 
1987) (holding that a misprision conviction was not 
a conviction “relating to” a controlled substance 
even when the felony concealed was distribution 
of a controlled substance).
•  Renato DeBartolo was charged in 2011 with two 
counts of possession with intent to distribute and 
manufacturing marijuana under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)
(1), the same statute as Mr. Lee. DeBartolo v. 
United States, 790 F.3d 775, 777 (7th Cir. 2015). Mr. 
DeBartolo had a previous state cocaine trafficking 
conviction, making him eligible for a mandatory 
minimum of 10 years had the government filed an 
information under 21 U.S.C. § 851. Instead, Mr. 
DeBartolo pleaded guilty to the manufacturing 
charge and received a significant discount on 
sentencing, from a five-year minimum down to 
25 months. Id. at 777. Mr. DeBartolo was brought 
to the United States when he was one year 
old, had married an American citizen, owned a 
construction company for some time, and had at 
least seven children born in the United States. 
Id. at 776-77. Based on his guilty plea to the 2011 
charges, he was deported to Italy, where he had no 
family and did not speak the language. Id. at 777. 
Despite his previous conviction, the sentencing 
discount, and evidence that the government 
characterized as “stacked” against Mr. DeBartolo, 
the Seventh Circuit found prejudice in trial 
counsel’s failure to understand and bargain to 
avoid the mandatory deportation consequences 
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of Mr. DeBartolo’s guilty plea. Id. at 779. The 
court noted how Mr. DeBartolo “could have tried 
to negotiate a different plea deal for an offense 
that does not make deportation mandatory. For 
example, he could have offered to plead guilty to 
simple possession of 30 grams of marijuana and 
perhaps received the same 25-month sentence.” 
Id. at 779.
All of these methods of securing a plea that might avoid 
deportation demonstrate how it is objectively rational for 
someone in Mr. Lee’s position to reject a plea that will lead 
to automatic and mandatory deportation. These numerous 
avenues for plea bargaining underscore how competent 
defense counsel, armed with an understanding of the 
immigration consequences of criminal convictions, could 
have secured such a plea. Absent successful negotiations, 
it would be perfectly rational for someone in Mr. Lee’s 
position to exercise his constitutional right to trial. See 
Brief for Petitioner, at 25-29.
II. Defense Attorneys Had Many Resources Available 
to Them in 2009 and Earlier to Help a Non-Citizen 
Client Avoid Deportation.
In seek ing a lternat ive outcomes that avoid 
unnecessarily harsh immigration consequences, defense 
counsel does not operate alone, or in a vacuum. Rather, 
there are a number of resources in place for counsel to 
consult with immigration experts about consequences 
of particular convictions. There are also many well-
regarded treatises, practical guides, charts, and other 
written materials widely available for defense counsel 
to consult on the topic of immigration consequences of 
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convictions. Most relevant to the prejudice inquiry, these 
consultations and written materials are replete with—
and sometimes entirely focused on—ways to negotiate 
to avoid unnecessary immigration consequences, and 
practical tips on plea bargaining alternatives that might 
satisfy both parties’ interests. Putting the content of those 
consultations and materials into action in negotiations, as 
demonstrated by the stories in Part I supra, highlights 
the likelihood of mitigating immigration consequences for 
non-citizen defendants in many instances.
For decades, criminal defense counsel have enjoyed 
ready access to a variety of resources to help them negotiate 
pleas that avoid adverse immigration consequences. 
Amici’s brief in St. Cyr detailed the many resources 
predating 1996 on the immigration consequences of 
criminal convictions and practical ways to avoid, through 
proper counseling, negotiation, and other advocacy, 
unnecessary immigration consequences. See Brief of 
Amici Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et 
al. (NACDL) at 6-10, App. 8a-20a, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 
U.S. 289 (2001) (No. 00-767) (“St. Cyr Amicus”). Amici’s 
2009 brief in Padilla v. Kentucky—written the year 
Mr. Lee pleaded guilty—reflects that the availability of 
resources has multiplied considerably since St. Cyr. The 
brief describes the extensive array of resources available 
at the national level to assist criminal defense attorneys 
in advising their non-citizen clients and details how 
these national efforts have been successfully replicated 
on a local scale in jurisdictions throughout the nation. 
Brief of Amici Curiae NACDL at 25-39, App. 13a-30a, 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (No. 08-651) 
(“Padilla Amicus”); see id. at 25-26 (describing National 
Immigration Project of the National Lawyer Guild’s more 
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than 3,000 instances of free assistance and nearly 10,000 
listserv posts between 2003-2009); id. at 27-28 (describing 
Immigrant Defense Project’s free, nationally-available 
hotline and the organization’s individualized assistance 
in about 12,000 cases between 1997-2009); id. at 30-31 
(describing Defending Immigrants Partnership’s 220 
training sessions between 2002-2009 for about 10,500 
people and “extensive resource library of materials” 
available to defenders on its website at no cost).
Mr. Lee’s case exemplifies the missed opportunities 
for plea bargaining to avoid unintended and unnecessary 
immigration consequences when counsel gives a defendant 
incorrect information about a conviction’s immigration 
consequences. In the five years before Mr. Lee’s guilty plea, 
Tennessee criminal defense attorney and immigration 
specialist Michael Holley published several practice guides 
and conducted trainings about immigration consequences 
of convictions, including a training titled: The Long Road 
for the Short and Quick Plea: How the Easy Plea in 
Criminal Court Can Permanently Ruin Your Immigrant 
Client’s Life. See Padilla Amicus, App. C. at 27a-28a. The 
year before Mr. Lee’s plea in Memphis, Holley published 
a short, practice-oriented piece in a newsletter of the 
Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
which warned that for clients “facing an aggravated felony 
conviction, pleading guilty will almost always be out of the 
question.” Michael Holley, Immigration Consequences 
of Select Tennessee Offenses, The Defense, June-July 
2008, at 1, 2. The article described how defense counsel 
should propose “alternative dispositions” that would 
“both satisfy the prosecution . . . and also protect your 
client from immigration consequences.” Id. at 2. It went 
on to lay out the six “most fruitful” ways to protect the 
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client, including a plea “to a similar offense that carries 
the same criminal penalty but lesser or no immigration 
consequences.” Id. at 4; see also Padilla Amicus at App. 
13a-16a, 27a-28a (listing numerous resources for federal 
criminal defenders and Tennessee practitioners).
Amici’s briefs in both St. Cyr and Padilla reference 
the leading comprehensive treatises for defense attorneys 
with non-citizen clients. Many of those remain available 
and have been updated. See, e.g., Dan Kesselbrenner 
& Lory D. Rosenberg, Immigration Law and Crimes 
(2016-2ed.); Ira J. Kurzban, Kurzban’s Immigration Law 
Sourcebook: A Comprehensive Outline and Reference 
Tool (15th ed. 2016); Norton Tooby, Criminal Defense of 
Immigrants (2007 ed., updated monthly).
Counseling about and negotiation to avoid severe 
immigration consequences was routine among informed 
and effective criminal defense counsel in 2009, when Mr. 
Lee pleaded guilty. Since Padilla, the local, state, and 
national resources and structures in place for criminal 
defense counsel representing non-citizen clients have 
grown even more numerous. For example, the Training 
Division of the Defender Services Office (DSO) maintains 
a page, “Immigration Consequences of Conviction” 
which has tools, manuals, and links to resources on a 
variety of immigration topics related to federal criminal 
defense practice. Obligation to Advise on Immigration 
Consequences, Federal Defender, https://www.fd.org/
navigation/select-topics-in-criminal-defense/immigration-
consequences-of-conviction/subsections/obligation-
to-advise-on-immigration-consequences (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2017). Since 2011, the DSO has partnered with 
Heartland Alliance’s National Immigrant Justice Center 
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“to provide training and resources to CJA practitioners 
around the country on immigration-related issues.” There 
is a hotline and email address, with the promise of an 
attorney’s response to inquiries within 24 hours. National 
Immigrant Justice Center’s Defenders Initiative, 
Federal Defender, https://www.fd.org/navigation/select-
topics-in-criminal-defense/immigration-consequences-
of-conviction/subsections/national-immigrant-justice-
center’s-defenders-initiative (last visited Feb. 5, 2017); see 
also Fed. Def. of San Diego, Inc., Defending A Federal 
Criminal Case (2016) (including chapter on “Special 
Considerations in Representing Noncitizen Defendants”).
The prejudice suffered by non-citizens deprived of the 
opportunity to bargain for a plea that avoids deportation 
stands in stark relief against the backdrop of numerous 
immigration resources available to counsel to help develop 
alternative pleas that allow the government to fulfill its 
deterrent and retributive goals. Defense counsel who fail 
to avail themselves of such advice, training, and resources, 
much of it free and publicly available, prejudice their 
non-citizen clients by depriving them of the opportunity 
to make truly informed decisions about whether to plead 
guilty, go to trial, or renegotiate to obtain a plea offer or 
alternative disposition that allows them to remain in the 
country that they consider their home.
III. The Prejudice Inquiry is Context-Specific 
and Requires Demonstration of a Reasonable 
Probability of Rejection of the Guilty Plea, Not of 
an Acquittal at Trial.
Under the Sixth Circuit’s erroneous approach to the 
prejudice prong, the most egregious misadvice by counsel 
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can never prejudice a defendant so long as the evidence 
against that defendant appears to be very strong. This 
is because, according to the opinion below, “no rational 
defendant charged with a deportable offense and facing 
‘overwhelming evidence’ of guilt would proceed to 
trial rather than take a plea deal with a shorter prison 
sentence.” Lee v. United States, 825 F.3d 311, 314 (6th Cir. 
2016) (quoting Pilla v. United States, 668 F.3d 368, 373 
(6th Cir. 2012)). This statement reveals a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the way the criminal justice system 
actually works, and a retreat from this Court’s significant 
inroads into correcting that misunderstanding in Padilla, 
Lafler, and Frye. See, e.g., Frye, 566 U.S. at 144 (“In 
today’s criminal justice system, . . . the negotiation of a 
plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost 
always the critical point for a defendant”). In the actual 
criminal justice system, defendants are often overcharged, 
counsel who function effectively seek favorable plea offers 
that fulfill the client’s goals, plea offers often get more 
favorable as the case moves towards trial, and the relatively 
rare trial frequently reveals unexpected evidence and 
sometimes a result not obvious from the government’s 
charging documents. See, e.g., Part I.B supra, Cases of 
M.I. and Ramirez-Carrillo. See also Albert Alschuler, 
The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 50, 85-105 (1968) (“The Problem of Overcharging”). 
The narratives in Part I of this brief, Mr. Lee’s Merits 
brief, and the brief of Amici Asian Americans Advancing 
Justice are replete with such examples. See Part I. supra; 
Brief for Petitioner, at 25; Brief of Amici Curiae Asian 
Americans Advancing Justice et al., at 11-18. The Sixth 
Circuit effectively applied, and the government here seeks, 
a per se test for proving prejudice. Yet this Court “has 
never required an affirmative demonstration of likely 
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acquittal at such a trial as the sine qua non of prejudice.” 
United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 643 (3d Cir. 2011), 
abrogated on other grounds by Chaidez v. United States, 
133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
As this Court has made clear, the prejudice prong 
of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim involves a 
context-specific inquiry. Starting with Strickland, the 
prejudice inquiry has asked whether there is “a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different,” 
466 U.S. at 694, a standard that may include but does 
not end at the prospect of an acquittal after trial. Id. 
(“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome”). The Sixth Circuit 
referred to Hill v. Lockhart’s statement that to prevail, a 
defendant must show “a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial.” Lee, 825 F.3d at 313 
(quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). Yet Hill also recognized that 
courts must “focus[ ] on whether counsel’s constitutionally 
ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea 
process.” 474 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added). If there were 
any question that a trial-outcome analysis is relevant in 
some contexts but not others, and that the appropriate 
standard for proving prejudice more broadly addresses 
the outcome of the plea process, this Court put that to rest 
in Lafler v. Cooper: “The fact that respondent is guilty 
does not mean he was not entitled by the Sixth Amendment 
to effective assistance or that he suffered no prejudice 
from his attorney’s deficient performance during plea 
bargaining.” 566 U.S. at 169; id. at 174 (“[R]espondent has 
shown that but for counsel’s deficient performance there 
is a reasonable probability he and the trial court would 
have accepted the guilty plea.”).
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Recognizing that reasonable probability of a different 
outcome in the plea bargaining process is the proper 
prejudice inquiry, however, does not answer the 
question of how a defendant can meet his burden in this 
regard. Strickland instructs that the standard requires 
demonstrating something more than “some conceivable 
effect” yet less than a “more likely than not” effect on 
outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; see also id. at 694 
(“The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, 
and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the 
errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance 
of the evidence to have determined the outcome.”). And 
in Padilla, the Court held that “to obtain relief . . . a 
petitioner must convince the court that a decision to 
reject the plea bargain would have been rational under 
the circumstances” – not that he or she would have won 
at trial. 559 U.S. at 372 (emphasis added).
Determining whether a rational person in the 
petitioner’s circumstances would have rejected the plea 
given correct immigration information and available 
outcomes through effective plea bargaining is an objective 
inquiry. However, the government’s prediction of how 
a trial would have unfolded is not the only “objective” 
factor at issue,3 and is not particularly relevant when the 
3.  Indeed, it is worth noting that strength of the evidence is 
often less objective than other factors. Particularly when a guilty 
plea happens early, a case’s apparent strength will come from the 
government’s charging document and perhaps supporting affidavits 
by law enforcement. At this juncture, defense counsel may not yet 
have conducted discovery nor investigated the case or even fully 
explored defenses or other trial strategies. See William J. Brennan, 
Jr., Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest For Truth? A 
Progress Report, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1990) (“The essential purpose 
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claim of prejudice flows from counsel’s failure to secure 
a plea or other disposition that avoids at least the most 
serious immigration consequences. A petitioner’s personal 
circumstances are always highly relevant, including his 
ties to this country and his relationship, if any, with his 
country of origin. See, e.g., DeBartolo, 790 F.3d at 778 
(finding it “unquestionabl[e]” that a 48-year-old who 
immigrated to the United States at age one with his 
family, married an American citizen, had at least seven 
American citizen children, had owned a small business 
in Indiana, and had no family in Italy or knowledge of 
the language, would have taken his chances at trial had 
he known the deportation consequences of his guilty 
plea); Alam v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 2d 647, 653–54 
(W.D.N.C. 2009) (finding no “reason to doubt” petitioner’s 
claim that he would have rejected a guilty plea but for 
counsel’s erroneous assurances it would not make him 
deportable, in light of objective evidence of petitioner’s 
25 years in the U.S., his U.S. citizen children, and his 
successful business here). A defendant’s testimony about 
his willingness to reject one plea with the goal of securing 
a disposition more favorable to his immigration status, 
or to risk a trial despite the possibility or even likelihood 
of a longer period of incarceration, are also factors that 
of permitting a criminal defendant to engage in pretrial discovery of 
the prosecution’s case is to enhance the truth-finding process so as to 
minimize the danger that an innocent defendant will be convicted”). 
Cf. Evid. Hr’g, at 36-37, 47 (Mr. Lee testified, and the court deemed 
his testimony credible, that trial counsel never reviewed the elements 
of the crime charged with him nor explained what the government 
would have had to prove at trial to secure a conviction, that he was 
unaware there was a confidential informant involved in his case until 
he saw the Pre-Sentence Report, and that counsel failed to show him 
photographs of the drugs recovered from his apartment).
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can be viewed through the objective lens of a reasonable, 
similarly-situated defendant. Courts are well equipped to 
assess individual facts and circumstances objectively, and 
do so in a number of different situations. See generally 
Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure In Perspective, 98 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 71 (2007) (describing various 
such contexts).
Just as courts reviewing ineffective assistance claims 
are well-equipped to view the defendant’s personal 
circumstances through an objective lens, they must heed 
this Court’s caution that the prejudice inquiry proceed 
without regard for the “idiosyncracies of the particular 
decisionmaker.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. The prejudice 
inquiry’s objective nature narrows the scope of evidence 
a defendant must offer at a post-conviction hearing to 
demonstrate the likelihood of a different result but for 
counsel’s ineffectiveness. It would be unfair and improper 
to require defendants to show that the particular 
prosecutor in the particular case would have offered a 
particular alternative plea.
Such a standard would mean a prosecutor’s office could 
effectively immunize itself from all ineffective assistance 
claims based on prejudice relating to alternative plea 
outcomes by attesting to its refusal to offer alternative 
pleas. Petitioners in post-conviction proceedings cannot 
reasonably be expected to secure testimony from the very 
prosecutor’s office that opposes his petition, about how 
it may have offered an alternative plea. Such a standard 
would also mean that defendants in one jurisdiction 
would carry a different burden from defendants in 
another jurisdiction. Finally, it is worth noting that 
many ineffective assistance of counsel claims will be 
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pursued by pro se petitioners, see Eve Brensike Primus, 
Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 Cornell L. 
Rev. 679, 681 (2007), and it would be unfair to expect 
a pro se petitioner, often incarcerated, to develop such 
testimony at a hearing or in a filing. See Roe v. Flores-
Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 486 (2000) (“[I]t is unfair to require 
an indigent, perhaps pro se, defendant to demonstrate 
that his hypothetical appeal might have had merit before 
any advocate has ever reviewed the record in his case in 
search of potentially meritorious grounds for appeal.”) 
(emphasis deleted). While in a rare case a well-resourced 
post-conviction petitioner might find a criminal defense 
lawyer who has secured a more favorable outcome in a 
similar case and who is willing to testify, or even a former 
prosecutor from the jurisdiction willing to testify about 
their former office’s plea policies, that type of evidentiary 
bar is both unrealistic and unfair, particularly to those 
without counsel. It is for these reasons that, with respect 
to the competency prong of the ineffective assistance 
test, this Court has used prevailing national norms to 
determine the reasonableness of counsel’s performance. 
See, e.g., Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366-68; Wiggins v. Smith, 
539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003). This avoids the troubling race-
to-the-bottom that might occur if the constitutional floor 
were set at the lowest local level of performance.
Part I supra illustrates the spectrum of reasonable 
alternative outcomes in a variety of circumstances, 
including Mr. Lee’s. The fact that the record below does 
not refer to alternative offers that were made and rejected 
should not be surprising. After all, trial counsel believed 
Mr. Lee would not be deported and so did not even attempt 
to negotiate to avoid that result. It is at the pre-trial stage 
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of a criminal case, when defendants have a right to counsel, 
where effective bargaining to meet a defendant’s goals, 
including immigration goals, must happen. Even though 
the Sixth Circuit in the opinion below erroneously stated 
that the record was devoid of evidence that Mr. Lee’s 
counsel could have secured a plea that would have avoided 
mandatory deportation,4 the relevant inquiry is whether it 
is reasonably probable that Mr. Lee would have rejected 
the plea that led to mandatory deportation and instructed 
his counsel to seek an alternative.
“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694. All of the possibilities outlined in Part I supra 
undermine confidence in the outcome for Mr. Lee, namely, 
conviction on the only count with which he was charged, 
an aggravated felony rendering him presumptively and 
mandatorily deportable. The prejudice inquiry is not about 
whether a defendant made a rational decision to plead 
guilty with erroneous immigration advice from counsel. 
Rather, it is about whether a decision to reject the plea 
would have been rational had that defendant been fully and 
correctly informed that it would render him deportable, 
and had counsel used immigration consequences as a 
touchstone in counseling the client about any plea and in 
negotiations.
4.  At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel was asked whether, 
had Mr. Lee “been offered three years and reliable assurances that 
he would not be deported, would he have taken that?” Trial counsel 
responded: “He would have.” Evid. Hr’g, at 124. In addition, Mr. Lee’s 
trial counsel testified that, although the case “probably was a losing 
proposition in someway [o]f course, you know, as defense counsel, you 
have a lot of losing propositions that you end up coming out better 
than you think. Probably the best -- the best thing that could have 
come out of this was maybe a possession, that’s it.” See id. at 115-16.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be 
reversed.
   Respectfully submitted,
Ira J. Kurzban
Counsel of Record
edward F. ramos
Kurzban Kurzban weInger  
tetzelI & Pratt, P.a.
2650 SW 27th Avenue, Suite 200
Miami, Florida 33133
(305) 444-0060
ira@kkwtlaw.com
Jenny roberts
amerIcan unIversIty
washIngton college oF law*
4300 Nebraska Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016
(202) 274-4298
Counsel for Amici Curiae
* Institutional affiliation provided 
for identification purposes only
